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DAMAGES AGAINST FEDERAL
OFFICERS-THE SECOND CIRCUIT
CONTRIBUTES TO EXECUTIVE
INTERFERENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

LITIGATION THROUGH IMPROPER

BIVENS ANALYSIS
Kristina A. Kiik*

N Arar v. Ashcroft,' a divided Second Circuit held that violations of
substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment are not actiona2
ble pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.
The court erroneously considered the state-secrets privilege, a commonlaw evidentiary rule that allows the government to withhold information
from discovery in the interest of national security, 3 as a "special factor"
under Bivens and consequentially denied the judicial creation of a damages remedy. 4 This decision has serious negative implications for national
security litigation: it unduly expands executive intrusion in the judicial
sphere and departs from recent U.S. Supreme Court pronouncements on
the separation of powers.
On September 26, 2002, Maher Arar, a dual Canadian-Syrian national,
arrived from Switzerland at John F. Kennedy Airport while in transit
from Tunisia to Montreal, Canada. 5 In New York, federal agents for what
was then the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") identified Arar as a member of al Qaeda, a known terrorist organization, and
therefore inadmissible to the United States.6 Pursuant to this determination, the INS Regional Director designated him to be removed to Syria
"without further inquiry before an immigration judge."' 7 Prior to his removal, federal agents allegedly subjected Arar to harsh interrogation and
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2010. 1 am grateful to Professor

Anthony J. Colangelo for his suggestions and encouragement. Words fail me in thanking
my parents, Matti and Urve Kiik, for their unwavering love and support.
1. 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 164 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)).
3. See Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991).
4. Arar, 532 F.3d at 183.
5. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 254.
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detention for thirteen days. 8 These agents purportedly gave him an opportunity to return voluntarily to Syria, but he refused. 9 Arar believed he
would be tortured if he went back to Syria and asked his interrogators to
send him to Canada or return him to Switzerland instead.1 0 On October
8, 2002, however, federal agents flew Arar to Amman, Jordan, where
Jordanian authorities turned him over to Syrian military officials.11 These
officials allegedly tortured and detained Arar for nearly one year without
filing any formal charges against him. 12 On October 5, 2003, at the request of the Canadian government, Syrian authorities released Arar into
the custody of Canadian diplomats in Damascus, and he later returned to
13
his family in Ottawa.
On January 22, 2004, Arar brought suit in federal court on statutory
14
and constitutional grounds seeking declaratory and monetary relief.
Count one claimed that U.S. officials conspired with Syrian and
Jordanian authorities in violation of the Torture Victim Prevention Act
("TVPA"). 15 Arar alleged that federal agents provided Syrian authorities
with information about him and suggested subjects for interrogation as
part of a plan to extract counter-terrorism information. 16 Counts two and
three alleged that U.S. officials violated Arar's Fifth Amendment rights
by knowingly and intentionally subjecting him to torture and interrogation in Syria, and that as a result of these actions, Syrian officials arbitrarily detained him.1 7 Arar alleged these federal officers removed him to
Syria pursuant to the U.S. government's "extraordinary rendition" program, whereby suspected terrorists are sent to foreign countries for interi8
rogation and detention otherwise not permitted in the United States.
Count four alleged several additional due process deprivations that occurred while Arar was in U.S. custody. 19 Arar also sought Bivens damages from the federal officers he claimed were responsible for violating
his Fifth Amendment rights. 20 The government moved to dismiss the action by asserting the state-secrets privilege over information relating to
2
the first three counts and lack of personal jurisdiction over the fourth. '
On February 16, 2006, the district court dismissed counts one through
three for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
thus did not reach the issues raised by the government's assertion of the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 286-87.
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state-secrets privilege. 2 2 The court dismissed count four for lack of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. 23 The district court also
held that no cause of action under Bivens could be extended in light of
special factors counseling hesitation. 24 The court went on to name na25
tional security and foreign policy considerations as the special factors.
After the Clerk of the Court entered judgment dismissing the action with
26
prejudice, Arar appealed.
In a split opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and its refusal to award Bivens damages. 27 Judge Sack filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 28 He agreed with the
majority's determination that Arar made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, his complaint did not state a claim
under the TVPA, and he had not established federal subject matter jurisdiction over his declaratory judgment request.2 9 Judge Sack, however,
disagreed with the majority's refusal to provide Bivens relief and 30would
have allowed Arar's claims for money damages to move forward.
The Supreme Court in Bivens created a non-statutory damages remedy
for violations of the Fourth Amendment by agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics. 31 Although the U.S. Constitution vests Congress with legislative power, 32 Bivens held that, in appropriate circumstances, the Constitution itself provides an implied cause of action for its own violation by
federal officers. 33 Courts conduct a fact-sensitive, two-step inquiry to determine whether an extension of Bivens relief is proper. 34 First, a court
will examine whether an alternative damages remedy exists or there is an
explicit congressional prohibition against one. 35 Either would bar the judicial recognition of an implied cause of action. Second, a court must
consider "special factors" that would "counsel hesitation" and foreclose
the availability of a remedy. 36 These considerations "d[o] not concern
the merits of the particular remedy [being] sought," but rather involve
"the question of who [Congress or the courts] should decide whether such
22. Id. at 287.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 281.
25. Id.

26. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 2008). Arar did not amend his complaint to cure the jurisdictional defects and instead appealed from the judgment of the
district court. Id.
27. Id. at 164.
28. Id. at 193 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. Id. at 201.
30. Id.
31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing the basis for civil action for deprivation of rights).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
33. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 401-03 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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a remedy should be provided. '37
The Arar majority approached the Bivens inquiry by separating the
damages sought into two sets of claims. 38 The first set, and the subject of
this Casenote, encompassed counts two and three of Arar's complaint
which arose from the allegation that federal officers "removed him to
Syria with the knowledge or intention" that he would be unlawfully detained and tortured there.3 9 Step one of the Bivens analysis revealed that
Congress provided a remedial scheme in the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1988 ("FARRA") for claims arising from an alien's
40
involuntary return to a country where he believed he would be tortured.
Step two showed that special factors, including national security interests,
foreign policy concerns, and the state-secrets privilege, weighed against
the judicial recognition of an implied cause of action. 41 The gravamen of
the special-factors examination was a fear that the court's creation of a
damages remedy would interfere with the political branches' conduct of
foreign policy.4 2 But regrettably the court also considered that "the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege in this litigation constitutes a further special factor counseling us to hesitate before creating a
'43
new cause of action or recognizing one."
The Second Circuit looked to Bivens precedent involving the coordinate branches of government for guidance on what might be considered a
special factor. In Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court determined that it
was preferable for Congress to evaluate the impact of damages suits for
alleged violations of a federal employee's First Amendment rights.44 In
Chappell v. Wallace, the Court refused to extend Bivens relief to victims
of alleged violations of constitutional rights by military officers because
Congress enjoys "plenary control" over military discipline.4 5 And in
Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, then-Judge Scalia sitting on the D.C. Circuit
concluded that Congress must determine whether a damages remedy
should exist "against military and foreign policy officials for allegedly un46
constitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad.
While the Arar majority provided some indication that an interference
with foreign relations might counsel against the judicial creation of a
37. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 376, 380 (1983)).
38. Id. at 178.
39. Id. The second set of claims in count four of the complaint arose from Arar's
allegations regarding his treatment while detained in the United States. Id. The Second
Circuit determined that these allegations did not state a claim under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and dismissed the complaint, thereby foreclosing a Bivens
remedy. Id. at 190.
40. Id. at 179.
41. Id. at 181-84.
42. Id. at 181-82.
43. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 178 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)).
45. Id. (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983)).
46. Id. at 182 (quoting Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
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damages remedy, it failed to offer any precedent that the state-secrets
privilege itself should be considered a special factor. The court merely
relied on a footnote from Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for the proposition
that "federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch's
view of the case's impact on foreign policy" when evaluating whether
47
monetary relief under Bivens is appropriate.
Judge Sack in dissent provided a more convincing Bivens analysis. Step
one of his inquiry showed that an alternative damages remedy did not
exist because Arar was not seeking the type of relief the FARRA was
designed to address. 48 In step two, Judge Sack found no special factors
counseling hesitation and criticized the majority's consideration of the
state-secrets privilege. 49 He noted that the proper invocation of the privilege would protect the legitimate national security interests that concerned the majority and that, at a minimum, Arar presented a viable
50
Bivens claim.
The majority's consideration of the state-secrets privilege as a special
factor is troubling for at least two reasons. First, it is an undue expansion
of executive intrusion in the judicial sphere. In United States v. Reynolds,
the Supreme Court formally recognized the state-secrets privilege as a
narrowly construed common-law evidentiary rule and held that when
"the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, . . . the court should not
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting
upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone. ''5 Since
Reynolds, courts have broadened this rule to include military and state
secrets, diplomatic relations, and intelligence sources. 52 Although the use
of the state-secrets privilege necessarily implicates national security, it is
distinguishable from nebulous foreign relations concerns that occupy
both political branches of government, such as those in Sanchez-Espinosa
v. Reagan, which might counsel against a Bivens remedy. The privilege,
indeed, is wholly within the province of the executive branch: the department that controls the matter of the case has unconditional authority over
its assertion, there is no congressional oversight over its invocation, 53 and
47. Id. at 182-83 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004))
(emphasis added).

48. Id. at 211 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arar challenged the
constitutionality of his treatment by federal officers, but not his immigration removal order. Id. at 211-12.
49. Id. at 212.
50. Id. at 213-14.
51. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
52. See Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope
Through Government Misuse, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 99,106 (2007) (collecting cases).
53. Several scholars and the American Bar Association have urged Congress to clarify
or codify the state-secrets privilege. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to National
Security Information, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 219, 220-21 (2008); Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege:Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 629, 641, 653 app. (2008). To date, however, Congress has not
enacted such legislation. Cf State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong.
(2009); State Secret Protection Act of 2009, S.417, 111th Cong. (2009).
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courts have considered it to be "absolute. '54
This makes its consideration as a special factor under Bivens particularly inappropriate. Bivens prescribed a framework for the judicial recognition of an implied cause of action against the backdrop of congressional
deference to the creation of a damages remedy. The state-secrets privilege is quintessentially an executive tool, and when considered as a special factor, the court defers not to a congressional determination, but to
an executive determination of whether a cause of action should exist. In
other words, the Arar court did not give the Executive Branch's view of a
case's impact on foreign policy "serious weight" when it considered the
state-secrets privilege as a special factor.5 5 On the contrary, the court
gave it the unilateral power to deny the enforcement of a constitutional
right. This is tantamount to complete executive deference to the creation
of a damages remedy, which defies nearly forty-years of Bivens
jurisprudence.
Second, the majority's consideration of the state-secrets privilege is a
departure from recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the separation
of powers. In Harndi v. Rumsfeid, also involving the constitutional rights
of an al Qaeda terrorist suspect, the Court cautioned that "whatever
power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of
conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake."' 56 The state-secrets privilege envisions
no role for the legislature in its construction and no role for the judiciary
in its practice. Unlike the special factors the Court found in Lucas, Congress cannot "evaluate" the state-secrets privilege. Unlike Chappell, Congress does not "control" or regulate the state-secrets privilege. Nor is
there any real judicial check on its application. Although the Reynolds
Court stressed that the decision to withhold evidence is made by the presiding judge, an invocation of the state-secrets privilege rarely has been
defeated. 57 Thus, the Second Circuit's consideration of a purely executive
doctrine as a special factor abandoned the tripartite deliberations necessary to guard against an erosion of individual liberties in times of national
challenge.
In Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit should not have considered the
state-secrets privilege as a special factor counseling against the judicial
creation of a damages remedy. The court contributed to a disturbing
trend of executive interference in national security litigation through its
54. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-11 (collecting cases); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets
and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1270 (2007).

But see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting
the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege in an extraordinary rendition
case).
55. See supra text accompanying note 47.
56. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sack, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
57. See Lyons, supra note 52, at 110-11.
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improper Bivens analysis. The state-secrets privilege is a shield, not a
sword: the Supreme Court recognized it to protect the legitimate interests
of the U.S. government, not to empower federal officers to violate constitutional rights without consequence. Indeed, the government's persistent
use of the state-secrets privilege 58 likely will foreclose the judicial creation of a damages remedy in matters concerning national security. But
the outcome of this case extends beyond those involving terrorist suspects. By considering the states-secret privilege as a special factor under
Bivens, the Second Circuit unmoors itself from enforcing the constitutional rights of all individuals whenever an executive interest is present.

58. See Editorial, The Unfinished Case of Maher Arar, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at
A26 ("Last week, in a rendition case argued in San Francisco, Mr. Obama's Justice Department sent a troubling signal of continuity by embracing the extravagant state-secrets claims
pioneered by the Bush administration."); see also Redacted, Unclassified Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 22, Jeppesen Dataplan, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009)
(No. 08-15693).
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